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Abstract
The paper shows that taking inventory control out of the hands of retailers and
assigning it to an intermediary increases the value of a supply chain when demand
volatility is high. This is because an intermediary can help solve two incentive
problems associated with retailers’ inventory control and thereby improve the in-
tertemporal allocation of inventory. Adding an intermediary as a new link in a
supply chain is also shown to reduce total inventory, to make shipments from the
manufacturer less frequent and more variable in size, as well as to reduce social
welfare.
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1 Introduction
The optimal control of inventory is one of the greatest challenges faced by
rms in a supply chain. Consider, for instance, a supply chain, in which a
manufacturer distributes goods through retailers who hold inventory because
they have to order and take delivery of goods before observing the state
of demand and selling to consumers. A key problem in this setting, as
explained by Krishnan and Winter (2007), is that the retailersincentives to
hold inventory are generally not aligned with the manufacturers interests.
Hence the challenge is how to solve such incentive problems so that the
supply chains value can be maximized.
In the current paper, we o¤er two main insights into this issue. First, we
identify two specic incentive problems associated with retailersinventory
control that arise from the intertemporal allocation of inventory. Second, we
show how these incentive problems may be mitigated by taking inventory
control out of the hands of retailers and assigning it to an intermediary. In
particular, we derive conditions under which adding an intermediary in the
supply chain to control inventory raises the chains value. Our model of in-
termediation based on inventory control allows us then to derive predictions
about the use of intermediaries in supply chains and about the associated
pattern of shipments and inventories, as well as to examine the normative
implications of using intermediaries to control inventory.
Studying the role of intermediaries in controlling inventory is relevant
and interesting, not least because we observe a general trend toward shifting
inventory control from retailers to intermediaries in many retail industries.
Three developments are particularly noteworthy in this respect, namely
drop-shipping, inventory consignment and vendor-managed inventory.
Drop-shipping is an arrangement where (mostly internet) retailers forward
buyersorders to a wholesaler who then ships the product from its own in-
ventory; this arrangement allows retailers to avoid holding any inventory
while providing a large choice of varieties to consumers.1 Inventory consign-
ment allows an upstream rm to own inventories held by downstream rms
while vendor-managed inventory (VMI), an increasingly popular arrange-
ment thanks in part to electronic sales and inventory tracking technologies,
allows an upstream rm to control these inventories.2
1See Randall, Netessine and Rudi (2006) for a recent comparison of drop shipping
with the classic case of retailer-controlled inventory. Companies engaged in this practice
include Alliance (www.aent.com), the largest distributor of home entertainment audio
and video in the US; Baker and Taylor (www.baker-taylor.com), a leading distributor of
books, videos and music products; ChemPoint (chempoint.com) in the chemical industry,
and Garden.com in the garden supply retail industry; see Netessine and Rudi, 2004.
Retailers such as Staples are both traditional retailers holding inventories and engage in
drop-shipping for out-of-stock items; see Randall et al. 2002.
2See Govindam (2013) for a survey, and Mateen and Chatterjee (2015). Wal-Mart
pioneered VMI with Procter and Gamble in the early 1980s; early adopters include KMart
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These practices are part of a more general trend to take inventory control
out of the hands of downstream rms and to deliver goods to them just in
time. This trend is reected in the growing use of third party logistics
(3PL) providers and their increasingly important role in handling inventory.
Warehousing and distribution activities represented 23.7% of the US 3PL
market of $158 billion (3PL gross revenue) in 2014, and the importance of
these activities is likely to increase in the future.3 Not only is the 3PL
market expected to grow at an annual rate of 4.4% between 2015 and 2022,4
but the number of supply chains wanting 3PL providers to deal with their
warehousing and distribution needs has been growing as well year after year.5
In e¤ect 3PL providers have made themselves indispensable to supply chains,
transforming themselves from being used on demand to establishing stable
and multi-year contractual arrangements with them. As a result the 3PL
industry has experienced signicant consolidations, especially concerning the
most successful value-added warehouse distribution providers(Excel, UPS
SCS, Kenco, Genco, Jacobson and DSC) which were growing especially fast
in the early 2000s (Foster and Armstrong, 2004) and which have now been
largely absorbed by large 3PL providers.6
To construct a theory of intermediation focusing on the incentive is-
sues associated with inventory control one needs to put aside a variety of
other aspects that have undoubtedly also contributed to the success of drop-
shipping, inventory consignment, VMI and, more generally, the inventory
management activities of intermediaries like the 3PL providers. In particu-
lar, we ignore economies of scale in inventory management that might give
intermediaries an advantage over retailers because they pool products from
di¤erent rms. We also ignore advantages coming from complementarities
between inventory management and other specialized services such as trans-
portation, as well as technological advantages that intermediaries may have,
for instance, in inventory tracking technology that may lower their variable
and JCPenney. Procter and Gamble now uses this practice worldwide; see datalliance.com.
Some of the intermediaries mentioned in the previous footnote also use VMI.
3Of course, domestic and international transportation management still represents
the main activity of logistics providers with 66% of US 3PLs gross revenue; see
http://www.3plogistics.com/3pl-market-info-resources/3pl-market-information/us-3pl-
market-size-estimates/. On the size of 3PLs market, see also World Bank (2014).
4See https://www.gminsights.com/industry-analysis/third-party-logistics-3pl-market-
size.
5For instance, 25% of users wanted their 3PL providers to handle inventory
management in 2016 compared to 21% in 2012, while order management and
fulllment represented respectively 19% in 2016 and 14% in 2012; see Third-
Party Logistics Study 2012 and 2016. For the 2016 report, see https :
==www:kornferry:com=media=sidebar downloads=2016 3PL study:pdf .
6Excel has become DHL Supply Chain in 2016; Genco has been absorbed by FedEx
in 2015; Jacobson was absorbed by Norbert Dentressangle in 2014 which in turn was
absorbed by XPO Logistics in 2015; Kenco, a North American provider, has partnered
with Hermes, a large European logistics provider for its international business.
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costs of managing inventory relative to retailers. Each of these features has
the potential of reinforcing the role played by intermediaries. By ignoring
them we choose to stack the model against intermediation in order to iso-
late how intermediaries may help solve the incentive issues associated with
inventory control.
The model used for this purpose is a standard model of a supply chain,
in which a manufacturer distributes goods through retailers. What is new
is that the manufacturer has to decide whether to assign inventory control
to retailers or to an intermediary. A key aspect of our theory rests on
the assumption that the intermediary possesses market power relative to
retailers. This is consistent with Spulber (1999) who argues that any theory
of intermediation requires intermediaries to have market power relative to
other market participants so that they can set prices and balance supply and
demand across time by holding inventory. Balancing demand and supply by
standing ready to buy goods and sell them at di¤erent points in time, is
exactly the role we assign to the intermediary. We model the asymmetry
in market power between retailers and intermediary in the simplest possible
way, namely by assuming that retailers are perfectly competitive, whereas
the intermediary is a monopolist.7
We show that market power gives the intermediary two advantages over
competitive retailers in controlling inventory. The rst advantage has to do
with the intertemporal allocation of inventory. Competitive retailers allocate
inventory so that todays retail price is equalized with tomorrows expected
retail price. We refer to this as intertemporal market integration. An in-
termediary with market power, by contrast, allocates inventory to equalize
todays marginal revenue with tomorrows expected marginal revenue. This
intertemporal market segmentation implies that retail prices can adjust more
readily when demand conditions di¤er across periods; that is, it improves
intertemporal price discrimination.
The second advantage of the intermediary arises when goods can be re-
ordered. Competitive retailers are ready to sell inventory carried over from
the past at any positive retail price, simply because the cost of these units
has already been sunk. This means that the residual demand faced by the
manufacturer today is reduced and so is the manufacturers price. In e¤ect,
the manufacturer competes with the inventory carried over by retailers from
the past. To limit this inventory competition the manufacturer would have
to keep shipments to retailers small in each period, but by doing so he
runs the risk of losing sales due to stockouts. We show that by assigning
inventory control to an intermediary the manufacturer may limit inventory
competition, while at the same time avoiding stockouts.
Simply put then, the intermediarys incentives to control inventory are
7See Deneckere et al. (1996) for an inuential paper that adopts a similar vertical
structure without intermediation to study incentive issues in inventory control.
3
better aligned on two counts with the interests of the manufacturer. Our
model predicts that the intertemporal misallocation associated with in-
tertemporal market integration and with inventory competition becomes
worse the higher is the variance of demand. Thus, from the manufacturers
point of view an intermediary is especially useful in markets where nal de-
mand is very volatile. We also show that, consistent with the intermediarys
role in reducing inventory competition, a shift in inventory control from re-
tailers to the intermediary reduces total inventory holdings and decreases
social welfare.
By constructing a theory of intermediation based on inventory control
our paper directly contributes to the market microstructure literature that
seeks to understand the role of intermediaries in market clearing. While this
literature has recognized the role that inventory plays in helping interme-
diaries match supply and demand intertemporally, it does not examine the
incentive problems that inventory control entails.8 Studying these incentive
problems is the domain of the literature on vertical control in industrial
organization and the management literature on supply chain coordination.9
In particular, Krishnan and Winter (2007) and Deneckere et al. (1996) ex-
plain that the price system generically fails to align retailersincentives with
those of the manufacturer as soon as inventory control is involved. Using a
vertically integrated supply chain as benchmark, and thus one in which all
incentive problems are solved, the approach of Krishnan and Winter (2007,
2010) is to identify contract forms, such as vertical price controls and buy-
back policies, that would permit a decentralized supply chain to achieve the
vertically integrated solution. Importantly, the structure of the supply chain
is held xed by assuming that inventory can only be held by retailers. Thus
this literature does not examine how, within a supply chain, an intermediary
may help solve incentive problems associated with inventory.
Our paper di¤ers from the literature on at least two counts: rst, the
intertemporal incentive problems we study are di¤erent from those exam-
ined in the papers above. In Krishnan and Winter (2007) and Deneckere et
al. (1996) inventory perishes after one period, so intertemporal problems do
not even arise. In Krishnan and Winter (2010) inventory does not perish
so quickly, which allows them to explicitly study intertemporal incentives
associated with retailer controlled inventory. But the incentive problems in
their paper arise from the assumption that the level of inventory held by
a retailer directly raises consumer demand, because a big inventory signals
8See Spulber (1999) for a survey. The optimal control of inventory in a supply chain is a
classic problem of both economics and management science. The analysis of optimal order
policies and inventory levels goes back to the seminal contribution of Arrow, Harris and
Marshak (1951). Clark and Scarf (1960) were the rst to establish an optimal inventory
policy in a multi-echelon supply chain.
9See Krishnan and Winter (2011) for a synthesis of the theory of contracts in supply
chains.
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to consumers that the retailer is more likely to have the product in stock;
hence retailers may hold too little inventory from the manufacturers point
of view. In our model, by contrast, the manufacturer is mostly concerned
about retailers holding, if anything, too much inventory, both because in-
tertemporal market integration implies they may carry more inventory for-
ward than would be required for optimal price discrimination, and because
unsold goods create inventory competition.
Second, rather than holding the structure of the supply chain xed and
looking for contracts that achieve the vertically integrated solution, we ask
what happens if inventory control is passed from retailers to an intermedi-
ary. By showing that assigning inventory control to an intermediary may
raise the aggregate prot of the supply chain, our model may explain why,
increasingly, intermediaries act as an important link in supply chains, espe-
cially if, in addition to inventory control, they o¤er complementary services
such as transportation and logistics coordination.
One of the intertemporal incentive problems identied by our paper,
namely the inventory competition problem, is closer in spirit to that faced
by a storable goods monopolist (Dundine et al., 2006): if consumers an-
ticipate an increase in future demand and thus higher future prices, they
stockpile goods today, which reduces future residual demand and forces the
monopolist to cut future prices.10 The consequences of strategic consumer
behavior like this for supply chains have been investigated by a number
of papers in the management science literature (see Krishnan and Winter,
2011, for a discussion). But, unlike in our paper, their focus is neither on
the intertemporal incentive issues involved in inventory control, nor on the
potential benets of shifting inventory control from retailers to an interme-
diary.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present
our model and the benchmark equilibrium for the case in which inventory
is controlled by retailers. We go through two versions of the benchmark
case. In the rst, restricted version retailers order and take possession of
goods only once and then allocate goods across time. This restricted version
allows us to highlight the problem of intertemporal market integration. In the
second version, we allow retailers to order goods in each period which leads to
the problem of inventory competition. We mainly use the restricted version
as a device to distinguish the two problems highlighted by the analysis:
intertemporal market integration and inventory competition. In Section 3
inventory control is passed to an intermediary. In Section 4 we show how
the intermediary helps solve these problems and what this implies for the
use of intermediaries, order and inventory patterns, as well as social welfare.
10Notice also the connection with the durable goods monopoly problem (Bulow, 1982)
where the monopolist has an incentive to cut price in the future, once consumers with the
highest willingness to pay have been served.
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Section 5 contains conclusions, and the Appendix collects the proofs of our
results.
2 Model and Benchmark Cases
Consider a manufacturer producing and selling goods before demand is
known. The manufacturer receives orders from and ships products either
directly to competitive retailers (in the absence of intermediation), or to a
single intermediary. Once demand has been revealed, the retailers then sell
to consumers if they hold the products, or in the case of intermediation, the
intermediary sells to retailers who then sell to consumers. This highlights
two key di¤erences between the case with and without intermediation. First,
in the absence of intermediation, the retailers hold inventories, that is to say
the units received from the manufacturer and stored before they are sold;
otherwise inventory is held by the intermediary. Second, intermediation in-
volves a single inventory holder, whereas in the absence of intermediation,
inventories are held by many retailers.
There are two sales periods, t = 1; 2, which means that the product under
consideration loses its value after two periods. Demand at time t = 1; 2 is
given by the linear inverse demand function: pt = A st+"t, where pt is the
retail price and st denotes nal sales. The random variables "t 2 [ d; d] are
intertemporally independent and uniformly distributed with density 1=2d.
The order of moves when the manufacturer sells directly to retailers is
as follows. At the beginning of period 1, the manufacturer announces a
producer price P1, retailers order and take possession of q1 units of goods
before demand in period 1 is known; then period-one demand is revealed and
the retailers sell s1  q1 in period 1, holding unsold units in inventory for
period 2. In period 2, the manufacturer sets producer price P2, and retailers
order quantity q2, again before period-two demand is known.11 Demand in
period 2 is then revealed and retailers sell s2  q2 + (q1   s1).
When dealing with an intermediary the manufacturer may use two-part
tari¤s, consisting of a producer price, Pt, and a xed payment (or transfer),
Tt for t = 1; 2.12 The timing of moves is then as follows: at the beginning of
period 1 the manufacturer sets a two-part tari¤ (P1; T1), the intermediary
orders and takes possession of quantity q1. Demand in period 1 is then
revealed, the intermediary chooses wholesale price w1, retailers purchase
from the intermediary and sell to consumers a quantity s1  q1. In period 2
the manufacturer chooses the two-part tari¤ (P2; T2), and the intermediary
orders a quantity q2. Then demand in period 2 is revealed, the intermediary
11We also consider the restricted case with a single order in period 1 covering both sales
periods; see below.
12 In principle the manufacturer could also use two-part tari¤s when it sells directly to
retailers, as could the intermediary in its dealings with retailers. But perfect competition
in retailing implies that the transfer in each case would be equal to zero in equilibrium.
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sets wholesale price w2, retailers order and sell s2  q2 + (q1   s1). Notice
our implicit assumption that the intermediary only ships to retailers in each
period exactly what they sell, i.e., st in period t = 1; 2. Any inventory of
unsold goods in period 1, q1   s1, is thus held by the intermediary. This
feature of the model mirrors the arrangements under drop-shipping and
vendor-managed inventory, where retailers do not exercise any control over
inventory.13
Our assumptions about pricing strategies (two-part tari¤s when the man-
ufacturer deals with the intermediary, simple unit prices otherwise) imply
that there is no double marginalization and that the entire expected prot
generated by the supply chain goes to the manufacturer. They also im-
ply that the manufacturer has nothing to gain from having more than one
intermediary.14
Our assumptions about the production and distribution technologies are
as simple as possible. The manufacturer incurs a constant unit cost of
production c. We let cw denote the per-unit cost of intermediation. The
marginal cost of retailers is normalized to zero, as is the cost of holding
inventory. There is also no discounting between periods. All market partic-
ipants are risk neutral. Hence importantly, intermediation is not associated
with economies of scale and even involves a cost disadvantage relative to
direct sales to retailers.
We also assume A > c + cw, and that the demand shock is not too
big, d  d, so that equilibrium prices and quantities in each period are
always non-negative in all the environments considered in the analysis.15
Importantly, the latter assumption implies that in equilibrium all inventory
remaining in period 2 is being sold at a positive price and thus that destruc-
tive competition (Deneckere et al., 1996, 1997), another source of (static) in-
centive problems arising from retailer controlled inventory, is assumed away.
Allowing for these additional problems would obscure the intertermporal
incentive issues that we focus on.
We now consider the equilibrium in which inventory is controlled by
retailers. We nd it useful to start the analysis with the restricted case in
13One way to think further about intermediation which is implicit in the timing of
deliveries is that the intermediary is physically located closer to the retailers than it is to
the manufacturer.
14The assumption of perfectly competitive retailers is also not overly restrictive in the
sense that one can view the competitive outcome as the limit of a a sequential game among
oligopolistic retailers as the number of retailers gets large. In stage one retailers order
inventory, each taking the quantity of the other retailers as given (Cournot competition).
In stage two, after observing the true realization of demand, retailers simultaneously
announce retail prices. The outcome of the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game
converges to the perfectly competitive outcome as the number of retailers goes to innity.
See Tirole (1988), ch. 5 and the references cited there for the relevant convergence results.
15Of course, d depends on the other parameters of the model, A, c and cw, in a way
that is specic to each environment; see Appendix 1.
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which retailers make a single order and take delivery at the beginning of
period 1 only, and then analyze the case where retailers are free to order
and to receive delivery at the start of each period. Investigating these two
cases separately allows us to isolate the two incentive issues that arise when
retailers manage inventory, namely intertemporal market integration and
inventory competition.
2.1 Intertemporal Market Integration
Consider rst the case in which retailers may order goods only once. Thus
at the beginning of period 1 the manufacturer announces a producer price
P . Retailers order and take possession of q units of goods before demand in
period 1 is known; then period-one demand is revealed and the retailers sell
s1  q, holding unsold units in inventory for period 2. In period 2, retailers
sell s2  q   s1.
To derive the equilibrium suppose the demand shock "1 has been ob-
served by retailers in period 1. Retailers then sell in period 1 as long as
the rst period retail price, p1, exceeds the expected second-period retail
price, E (p2); otherwise, they hold on to goods for sale in period 2, where
all remaining inventory is sold. Hence, in equilibrium, p1 = E (p2), or
A  s1 + "1 = E (A  s2 + "2) = A  s2. This is what we mean by retailers
engaging in intertemporal market integration.
Given that s1 + s2 = q, we have s1 = (q + "1) =2 and s2 = (q   "1) =2.
The rst-period retail price and expected second-period retail price are then
both equal to p(q; "1) =
2A q+"1
2 . This has the following implications for the
manufacturers expected equilibrium output, prices and prots, where 
denotes equilibrium values and the superscript rrefers to retailer controlled
inventory:
Proposition 1 Suppose inventory is controlled by retailers and there is no
re-ordering. Intertemporal market integration implies that the producer price
and the expected retail prices in both periods are equal to the static monopoly
price, ~P r = E(~pr) = (A+c)2 . The manufacturers equilibrium output, ~q
r =
A  c, and expected equilibrium prot, E (~r) = (A c)22 , are equal to the sum
over two periods of the static monopoly outputs, respectively static monopoly
prots.
Proof: see Appendix 2.
Competition among retailers ensures that retailers equalize rst-period
retail price with second-period expected retail price. Thus with a single
order to cover both sales periods and inventory controlled by retailers, the
manufacturer completely gives up control of the intertemporal allocation of
the units he sells and there is nothing he can do to exploit demand di¤erences
across periods: the market in period one and two are ex ante identical from
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the manufacturers point of view. Not surprisingly then the outcome is
equivalent to the static monopoly situation.
2.2 Inventory Competition
Consider now the case where retailers are free to order goods in each period.
The rst thing we show is that it makes a di¤erence for the producer price
and expected retail price in period 2 whether retailers carry unsold goods
into the period (s1 < q1), or whether they have sold all their initial inventory
(s1 = q1). In the former case the manufacturer faces inventory competition
and is forced to reduce producer price P2 below the static monopoly price.
In particular, we can show:
Proposition 2 Suppose inventory is controlled by retailers. The second-
period producer price and expected retail price are lower than the static
monopoly price if there is inventory competition, and is equal to the sta-
tic monopoly price otherwise. Specically
P2 = E(p2) =
(
A+c
2   (q1 s1)2 if s1 < q1,
A+c
2 otherwise.
Proof: see Appendix 2.
How does the manufacturer optimally reduce inventory competition? To
understand this notice how much retailers with a given amount of inventory
in period 1 choose to sell in period 1 and how much inventory they keep
for period 2, after they have observed "1. As we know from the previous
subsection, retailers engage in intertemporal market integration by selling
a quantity s1 so that the retail price in period 1 equals the expected retail
price in period 2, that is, p1 = E(p2), or
p1 = A  s1 + "1 = A+ c  q1 + s1
2
= E2(p2): (1)
Given the level of q1 held by retailers, (1) o¤ers two possible outcomes for s1.
Either s1 < q1 so that there is inventory competition in period 2, or s1 = q1
meaning that retailers stock out and do not carry any unsold goods into
period 2. Which solution is relevant depends on the value of "1. Specically,
s1 =

A c+2"1
3 +
1
3q1 < q1 if "1 < "^1,
q1 otherwise,
(2)
where
"^1 = q1   A  c
2
: (3)
This shows how the manufacturer may reduce the likelihood of inventory
competition, namely by reducing q1, which decreases "^1. But obviously
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there is a trade-o¤, since by reducing q1 the manufacturer not only limits
inventory competition, but also raises the likelihood that a stockout occurs
and sales are lost. The following proposition shows how the manufacturer
optimally deals with this trade-o¤, where ^ denotes equilibrium values:
Proposition 3 Suppose inventory is controlled by retailers. The manufac-
turer reduces inventory competition by selling in period 1 more than the
one-period static monopoly output, namely qr1 =
(A c)
2 +
d
5 , and by incurring
a 40% probability that retailers stock out.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
To understand the intuition behind the manufacturers choice of q1, it is
useful to rewrite the manufacturers rst-order condition derived in Appen-
dix 2 (see (14)) as follows:
2 (A  c  2q1) + 7
dZ
"^1

A  c  2q1 + 8
7
"1

1
2d
d"1 = 0: (4)
The rst term represents the maximization condition for expected prots
assuming there is no possibility of a stockout. In this situation the un-
sold inventory carried by retailers into period 2 causes inventory competi-
tion, leading to a lower second-period producer price and to lower retail
prices. This term would be equal to zero at the static monopoly output of
q1 = (A  c)=2. That is, if there were no possibility of a stockout, the manu-
facturer would simply deliver the unconstrained optimal monopoly quantity
for period 1, because shipping so little reduces inventory competition. The
second term reects the adjustment in the maximization condition that has
to be made to account for the possibility of a stockout. Here it is clearly
seen that the static monopoly output is insu¢ cient to maximize prot. In-
stead the manufacturer would want to choose a higher output in period 1.
The probability of a stockout being less than 50% is then the by-product of
shipping more than the static monopoly quantity in period 1.
For period 2, however, we can show that the expected output is smaller
than the static monopoly output. Overall, we obtain the following result for
the manufacturers expected total output and total prot:
Proposition 4 Suppose inventory is controlled by retailers. The manufac-
turers total expected equilibrium output, E(qr) = qr1+E(q
r
2) = (A  c)+ 2d25 ,
and expected equilibrium prot, E (r) = (A c)
2
2 +
d2
25 , exceed the sum over
two periods of the static monopoly output, respectively static monopoly prot.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Re-ordering allows the manufacturer to set P2 after observing the de-
mand in period 1. Since P2 = E(p2) = p1 due to retailerscompetition, the
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manufacturers price in period 2 is di¤erent than his period 1 price which
satises P1 = E(p1). This means that the two periods are not the same for
the manufacturer, leading to intertemporal price discrimination and higher
expected prots than the sum over two periods of the static monopoly prof-
its.
This section has shown that, when retailers control inventory, intertem-
poral market integration and inventory competition place specic constraints
on a manufacturer in a two-period environment. In the next Section, we
consider the case where the manufacturer uses an intermediary with the
mandate to control inventory and to respond to orders from the retailers.
3 Inventory Control by an Intermediary
Like in our previous analysis, it is useful to start with the restricted case
where the intermediary may order only once at the beginning of period
1 (no-re-ordering case) before turning to the unrestricted case where the
intermediary is free to order in both periods (re-ordering case).
3.1 The No-Re-ordering Case
In this restricted case the manufacturer sets a two-part tari¤ (P; T ) at the
beginning of period 1, and the intermediary orders and takes possession of
quantity q. Demand in period 1 is then revealed, the intermediary chooses
wholesale price w1, retailers purchase from the intermediary and sell to
consumers a quantity s1  q. In period 2 the intermediary sets wholesale
price w2, retailers order from the intermediary and sell s2  q   s1.
The key di¤erence compared to the case of retailer controlled inventory
lies in the way the intermediary allocates q across the two periods. To see
this consider period 2. After the realization of "2 has been revealed and given
a wholesale price w2, retailers order and then sell an amount s2 so that the
second-period retail price equals the marginal cost faced by retailers; that
is (A  s2 + "2) = w2. The intermediarys expected period-two revenue is
thus equal to E [(A  s2 + "2) s2] = (A  s2) s2, and the expected marginal
revenue is E (MR2) = A  2s2.
Similarly, in period 1, after "1 has been revealed, the intermediary sets a
wholesale price w1 and retailers purchase and sell quantity s1, such that the
rst-period retail price equals w1, (A  s1 + "1) = w1. The intermediarys
revenue hence is equal to (A  s1 + "1) s1, and the corresponding marginal
revenue is MR1 = A  2s1 + "1.
In period 1, given the revealed demand shock "1, the intermediary allo-
cates output across periods until the marginal revenue in period 1 is equal
to expected marginal revenue in period 2, that is until
A  2s1 + "1 = A  2 (q   s1) : (5)
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This is what we mean by intertemporal market segmentation: by equalizing
marginal revenues, the intermediary generally causes retail prices to di¤er
across periods. In other words, the intermediary engages in intertemporal
price discrimination independently of re-ordering. This has the following
consequences for the manufacturers equilibrium output and expected prot:
Proposition 5 Suppose inventory is controlled by an intermediary and there
is no re-ordering. Intertemporal market segmentation implies that the man-
ufacturers equilibrium output, ~qi = A   c   cw, is equal to the sum over
two periods of the static monopoly output, and expected equilibrium prot,
E
 
~i

= (A c cw)
2
2 +
d2
24 , exceeds the sum of static monopoly prots.
Proof: see Appendix 2.
Several comments are in order. First, the fact that the manufacturers
equilibrium output is the same (at least net of cw) with and without interme-
diation when a single order is involved is not surprising. The intermediary is
exactly in the same ex ante position as the manufacturer, and the two-part
tari¤ ensures there is no ine¢ ciency associated with the vertical structure.
Second, the manufacturers expected prot is greater with intermediation
(again at least if cw is low enough) because the intermediary is able to price
discriminate across periods.16 Third, the benet from price discrimination
increases with d and thus with the variance of demand. To see why this
is so recall how retailers would allocate goods intertemporally. After ob-
serving demand in period 1, they would sell the quantity that equalizes the
rst-period consumer price with the expected second-period consumer price.
When demand turns out to be low in period 1, this intertemporal market in-
tegration implies that retailers sell very little and thus hold a large inventory
of goods for period 2; but when rst-period demand is high, retailers sell a
lot and hold very little inventory for period 2. In fact, when retailers control
the inventory, rst-period sales di¤er from expected second-period sales by
the amount of the demand shock: s1  s2 = "1. By contrast, when an inter-
mediary controls the inventory, sales in period 1 di¤er from expected sales
in period 2 by only half the amount of the shock: s1   s2 = 12"1 (see (5)).
Hence the intertemporal misallocation of inventory when it is controlled by
retailers increases with the size of the demand shock; a bigger d implies that
big demand shocks are more likely to occur.
3.2 The Re-ordering Case
In this subsection we want to show that by using an intermediary to control
inventory the manufacturer is better able to suppress inventory competition.
16With linear demand the comparison is also similar to the one between uniform pricing
and price discrimination when all markets (here both periods) are served: total expected
output is the same with and without price discrimination while expected prots are not.
See Tirole (1988).
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To see why inventory competition is a potential concern, notice that the
intermediary in period 2 can sell any inventory left over from period 1,
q1   s1. If it does not order any additional goods, it can sell these units at
an expected prot margin of [A  (q1   s1)  cw] and thus guarantee itself
a prot in period 2 of at least
out  [A  (q1   s1)  cw] (q1   s1): (6)
As a result the manufacturer has to either reduce the transfer it charges the
intermediary in period 2 by this amount, or else decrease its second-period
producer price.
The manufacturers optimal solution for this problem is to ship exactly
the same quantity in period 1 as in the case of no re-ordering. That is, it
ships in period 1 the static monopoly output for two periods. The reason for
this result, as we show in the proof of the following proposition, lies in the
fact that the intertemporal arbitrage condition that governs the intermedi-
arys allocation of rst-period orders between periods 1 and 2 is the same as
(5), so that the manufacturer can trust the intermediary to correctly allocate
goods across periods:
Proposition 6 Suppose inventory is controlled by an intermediary. The
manufacturer optimally sells in period 1 the same quantity as without re-
ordering, namely qi1 = ~q
i = A   c   cw. There is hence no possibility of a
stockout.
Proof: see Appendix 2.
Now that we have determined how much the manufacturer will ship in
period 1, we can determine how much will be shipped in equilibrium in
period 2. Because expected sales in period 2 are equal to A c cw2 and the
optimal allocation between periods 1 and 2 dictates that s1 =
q1
2 +
"1
4 (see
(18) in Appendix 2), then
q2 = s2   (q1   s1)
=
A  c  cw
2
  (q1   s1)
=
"1
4
: (7)
It follows that q2 > 0, precisely if "1 > 0. That is, goods are ordered in
period 2 only if demand in the rst period turns out to be greater than
expected. When "1 < 0, the intermediary does not order any goods in
period 2 and is content with the initial order. Accordingly, the expected
second-period shipment by the manufacturer is only
E
 
qi2

=
dZ
0
h"1
4
i 1
2d
d"1 =
d
16
: (8)
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The manufacturers total expected output and total expected prot can now
be computed. They are as follows:
Proposition 7 Suppose inventory is controlled by an intermediary. The
manufacturers equilibrium output, E
 
qi
  qi1 + E(qi2) = A   c   cw + d16 ,
is greater than the sum over two periods of the static monopoly output, and
the expected equilibrium prot, E
 
i

= (A c cw)
2
2 +
5d2
96 , exceeds the sum of
static monopoly prots.
Proof: see Appendix 2.
Clearly, an intermediary has the potential to add more value to the
supply chain when he engages in intertemporal market segmentation and
when he controls inventory competition.
4 Implications
We are now in a position to draw several implications from the analysis
by comparing the equilibrium where retailers control inventories with the
equilibrium where an intermediary does so. We focus most of our attention
on the cases where agents have the ability to place orders in every period.
The rst implication concerns the circumstances under which the manu-
facturer would use an intermediary. Recall that in the restricted case where
re-ordering is not allowed the prot associated with intermediation is in-
creasing in the variance of demand and thus d, simply reecting the fact
that intertemporal market segmentation and therefore price discrimination
become more important the greater is the potential for demand di¤erences
across periods. A comparison of Propositions 1 and 5 reveals that the man-
ufacturer would prefer inventory to be controlled by an intermediary if d is
su¢ ciently big to compensate for the resource cost of intermediation.
The following proposition shows that this result also holds in the more
general case where we allow intermediaries and retailers to order goods in
both periods (Propositions 4 and 7). We hence obtain the following impli-
cation:
Proposition 8 The manufacturer uses an intermediary to control inven-
tory if the variance of demand (and thus d) is su¢ ciently big.
Thus whether through the ability to price discriminate or to control in-
ventory competition, the opportunity cost of not using an intermediary is
higher for the manufacturer the bigger is the variance of demand. To see
why, consider the impact of a big negative demand shock on inventory com-
petition. In this case retailers are likely to carry a lot of unsold inventory
into the second period, even if the manufacturer only shipped a small quan-
tity in period 1, thus exposing the manufacturer to inventory competition
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and forcing him to cut the producer price. In the case of a big positive de-
mand shock the manufacturer faces another problem, namely that retailers
are likely to stock out and sales are lost.
Another implication concerns the total expected output of the manufac-
turer and hence total inventory:
Proposition 9 Total expected output and hence total inventory is smaller
when inventory is controlled by an intermediary rather than retailers.
Notice that this result holds, even if cw = 0. The reason has to do with
how the manufacturer deals with the problem of intertemporal competition.
In the case of retailer-controlled inventory the manufacturer wants to keep
rst-period output down so that retailers do not carry too much inventory
into period 2. But the less it ships, the bigger is the risk of a stockout.
In the case of intermediary-controlled inventory the manufacturer is able to
keep overall output small without running the risk of a stockout simply by
shipping a bigger quantity in period 1, namely the unconstrained optimal
monopoly quantity for both periods, and shipping additional units in period
2 only if demand in period 1 is higher than expected.
Clearly the di¤erent strategy the manufacturer employs to limit inven-
tory competition when inventory is controlled by an intermediary rather
than retailers also has implications for the pattern of per-period shipments
by the manufacturer. We can show:
Proposition 10 If inventory is controlled by an intermediary rather than
retailers, then (i) per-period shipments by the manufacturer occur on average
less frequently, and (ii) the variation in the size of expected shipments over
the two periods is greater.
As explained above, half of the time there is no shipment between the
manufacturer and the intermediary in period 2. By contrast, when retailers
control inventory, second period shipments by the manufacturer, as is easily
ascertained, are positive for every realization of "1.
A simple comparison of shipments in period 1 and expected shipments in
period 2 proves (ii). Also notice that the intermediarys expected shipments
to retailers are the same in both periods, as retailerssales satisfy E(s1) =
E(s2) =
1
2(A  c  cw). An interesting implication of Proposition 10 is thus
that the intermediary smooths the shipments to the retailers as compared
to those between the manufacturer and the retailers, or to those between
the manufacturer and the intermediary.
By itself, being able to engage in intertemporal market segmentation
reduces expected consumer surplus but it does not reduce expected social
welfare when there is no impact on expected output (i.e. for ~qr = ~qi when
cw = 0). However, since an intermediary reduces expected output even for
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cw = 0 when it engages in inventory control (i.e., E(qi) < E(qr)), it is
primarily through this e¤ect that the use of an intermediary has an anti-
competitive e¤ect and negative impacts on both expected consumer surplus
and expected social welfare. Indeed, we show that, even if cw = 0,
Proposition 11 Inventory control by an intermediary reduces expected con-
sumer surplus and expected social welfare.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
5 Conclusions
This paper shows that shifting inventory control from retailers to an in-
termediary, thereby adding a link in a supply chain, may be an optimal
strategy to follow for manufacturers in an environment in which orders have
to be placed before demand is known. This is the case even if adding an
intermediary is costly and decreases the overall volume of sales.
The reason is that an intermediary brings two advantages to inventory
control, both of which stem from better incentives to allocate inventory over
time. First, an intermediary can help a manufacturer price discriminate
across periods by intertemporally segmenting markets. Second, he can play
a role in reducing inventory competition, precisely because an intermediary
is able to segment markets intertemporally and can hence be trusted to
allocate inventory optimally. These advantages are shown to be especially
big in markets where demand is very volatile.
A number of implications ow from the analysis. The rst one is that
using intermediaries to control inventory tends to be anticompetitive be-
cause it reduces total sales and thus total inventory. This is because an
intermediary takes over the manufacturers monopoly position once orders
have been shipped by the manufacturer.
The second implication of the analysis is that the shipments between the
manufacturer and the intermediary tend to be less frequent and their sizes
more volatile than those between the manufacturer and the retailers. This
is interesting because it says that the lumpiness and volatility of shipments
may have a lot to do with who the buyer is and his role in the supply chain
and not only, as it is usually assumed, with product characteristics or the
existence of xed costs per shipment (see, for instance, Hornok and Koren,
2015 and Kropf and Sauré, 2014).
In fact the analysis reveals that the use of intermediation and shipment
lumpiness and volatility often go hand in hand but without clear-cut causal
links. On the one hand, when shipment lumpiness and volatility come from
exogenous constraints (as implicitly assumed in the restricted no-reordering
case), our results show that an intermediary may still increase the value of
a supply chain, although less so than when no such exogenous constraint
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exists. On the other hand, when re-ordering is possible and intermedia-
tion is optimal, shipments to an intermediary may still be as lumpy and
as volatile, this time because the optimal shipments and their timing dic-
tate it. Hence, intermediation and shipment lumpiness/volatility tend to go
together whether by choice or by constraint.17
Showing that intermediation is able to enhance the value of a supply
chain does not imply that intermediation is necessarily the best tool to do
so. In fact it can be shown that intermediation does not succeed in achieving
maximal vertical value. And since the literature on the theory of contracts
in supply chains shows that vertical restraints and other policies can help
achieving, at least in principle, maximal vertical value, one could conclude
that adding intermediation as a new link in a supply chain may well be a
second-best tool. This suggests that the choice between vertical contracting
arrangements and intermediation very much depends on the specic condi-
tions under which supply chains operate. In that regard the rapid growth of
3PL rms noted in the introduction, especially their increased global reach
as warehousing and distribution providers, as well as other new arrange-
ments aimed at shifting inventory control away from retailers, demonstrate
that intermediation might be especially useful in international markets.18
This should not come as a surprise. Global supply chains deal with long
distance, multiple markets, di¤erent legal jurisdictions and cultural envi-
ronments, all of which likely increase the cost of vertical contracting as com-
pared to the cost of delegating inventory control and associated decisions to
an intermediary.
Although it is well beyond the scope of the present article, our results
are potentially testable, especially in an international trade context as ship-
ments, product characteristics, and the buyers identity are often recorded.
But it is interesting to note that some of our theoretical predictions are con-
sistent with the empirical results about drop-shipping provided by Randall,
Netessine and Rudi (2006). The authors compare drop-shipping to the more
traditional arrangement where retailers hold their own inventories. This is
a similar structure to ours in so far as the drop-shipping arrangement corre-
sponds to the case where an intermediary takes over inventory control from
retailers. The authors nd empirical evidence that traditional retailers who
manage their own inventories face lower demand uncertainty than the re-
tailers that rely on drop-shippers to control inventory. This is consistent
with our result that using intermediaries to control inventories is optimal
17Choice and constraint can obviously operate both at the same time as is likely the
case for Welspun, Indias biggest manufacturer of towels, when it ships 40-50 containers
of towels at once to its warehouse in the US, a voyage taking at least 22 days to reach
its destination and when the shipment stays for another 20-25 days as inventory before
retailersorders arrive (Economist, 2015).
18 Interestingly, wholesale drop-shipping and other innovative wholesaling practices often
have an important international component; see PRWeb, 2006, 2012 for examples.
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when there is high demand uncertainty.19 They also nd that the greater
the number of retailers, the greater the use of drop-shipping. Although our
retailers are perfectly competitive and thus we have no particular result on
that dimension, it is interesting to note that the fundamental reason why
intermediaries might be needed is because retailers, as price takers, do not
have the same incentives as a manufacturer or as an intermediary. In that
sense this empirical nding is also consistent with our theoretical results.
6 Appendix 1
The upper limit d is determined as follows. First, consider the case of
inventory control by retailers and no re-ordering. In equilibrium, q = A  c.
Thus s1 =
q+"1
2 =
A c+"1
2 and s2 =
A c "1
2 . Thus, s1 and s2 are positive
when d < A   c: It is easy to establish that p1 and p2 are both positive if
d < A+c3 .
Second, consider the case of inventory control by retailers with re-ordering.
In equilibrium, q1 = 12 (A  c)+ 15d. Thus s1 = A c+2"13 + 13q1 = 12 (A  c)+
2
3"1 +
1
15d and s2 =
A c+(q1 s1)
2 . We know that if "1 <
1
5d (see Appendix
2), then q1 > s1; otherwise there is stockout. It is apparent then that s2 is
always larger than zero. To ensure s1 > 0; we require d < 56 (A  c). Along
with d < A+c3 , this condition guarantees that q2, p1 and p2 are positive
irrespective of "1.
Third, consider the case of inventory control by an intermediary and no
re-ordering. In equilibrium, q = A   (c+ cw). Thus s1 = 2[A (c+cw)]+"14
and s2 =
2[A (c+cw)] "1
4 . Thus, to make sure s1; s2 > 0, we need d <
2 [A  c  cw]. An intermediary controlling inventory also controls how
much to sell in the second period. In particular, one needs to make sure
that all the inventory from period 1, q   s1 = 2[A (c+cw)] "14 is sold in pe-
riod 2. This implies MR2 = A   22[A (c+cw)] "14 + "2 > 0 and thus that
d < 2(c+cw)3 . It can then be checked that this condition also makes sure that
MR1, p1 and p2 are positive as long as s1; s2 > 0.
Finally, the last case is inventory control by intermediary with re-ordering.
In equilibrium, q1 = A c cw, s1 = A c cw2 + "14 . If "1 > 0, then q2 = "14 > 0;
otherwise q2 = 0. s2 = q2+(q1  s1) = q2+ A c cw2   "14 is obviously always
larger than zero. To make sure s1 > 0, we need d < 2 [A  c  cw], which
also guarantees that there is no stockout in the rst period (i.e., q1 > s1).
It can also be checked that for the marginal revenue to be greater than zero
in each period, then MR2 = A   2s2 + "2 > 0 requires d < 2(c+cw)3 , which
in turn makes sure that MR1 > 0, p1 > 0 and p2 > 0 as long as s1,s2 > 0:
19Belavina and Girotra (2012) argue that intermediaries help rms adapt to a volatile
environment even if they are much larger than the intermediaries they typically use.
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It follows that
d < d = min

2 (c+ cw)
3
; 2 (A  c  cw) ; 5
6
(A  c) ; A+ c
3

(9)
for all the prices and quantities to be positive.
7 Appendix 2
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider how much retailers order before observing "1. Given perfect com-
petition the equilibrium orders satisfy that the expected retail price Ep(q; "1)
is equal to the marginal cost faced by retailers, namely the producer price
P , Z d
 d
(2A  q + "1)
2
1
2d
d"1 = P:
The manufacturer maximizes expected prot E [(P   c)q]. Solving the cor-
responding rst-order condition,Z d
 d
2A  2q + "1
2
1
2d
d"1   c = 0;
yields the desired result for expected output. The result for expected prices
and prot follows immediately.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
In period 2 retailers sell all of the products on hand, because they have
already paid for these goods and, since d  d, the retail price is positive;
hence s2 = q2+ q1  s1. Retailers order goods in period 2 until the expected
consumer price in period 2 equals the producer price P2:
E (A  s2 + "2) = A  q2   q1 + s1 = P2: (10)
The manufacturer chooses P2, respectively q2, that maximizes its period-
2 expected prot (P2   c)q2. This expected prot is maximized for q2 =
(A  c  q1 + s1) =2. Using this output in (10) gives the result.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Being perfectly competitive, retailers order goods in period 1 until the ex-
pected retail price is equal to marginal cost, which in this case is the producer
price P1:
"^1Z
 d
A+ c  q1 + s1
2
1
2d
d"1 +
dZ
"^1
(A  q1 + "1) 1
2d
d"1 = P1: (11)
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The rst term in (11) is the expected retail price in period 1 if there is no
stockout that we know from (1); the second term is the expected retail price
in case of a stockout. Substituting for s1, we can rewrite (11) as
"^1Z
 d
2A+ c+ "1   q1
3
1
2d
d"1 +
dZ
"^1
(A+ "1   q1) 1
2d
d"1 = P1:
The manufacturer chooses q1 to maximize total expected prot over the
two periods, which is given by
(P1   c)q1 + (P2(q1)  c)q2(q1) =
"^1Z
 d
"
2(A  c) + "1   q1
3
q1 +
(2(A  c) + "1   q1)2
9
#
1
2d
d"1
+
dZ
"^1
"
(A  c+ "1   q1) q1 + (A  c)
2
4
#
1
2d
d"1: (12)
Using the Leibniz Rule, we can write the rst-order condition associated
with (12) as
"^1Z
 d
2(A  c) + "1   4q1
9
1
2d
d"1 +
dZ
"^1
(A  c+ "1   2q1) 1
2d
d"1 +X = 0 (13)
where
X =
"
2(A  c) + "^1   q1
3
q1 +
(2(A  c) + "^1   q1)2
9
#
d"^1
dq1
 
"
(A  c+ "^1   q1) q1 + (A  c)
2
4
#
d"^1
dq1
:
Noting that d"^1dq1 = 1 and substituting for "^1 from (3) it is easily shown that
X = 0, so that we can rewrite (13) as
dZ
 d
2(A  c) + "1   4q1
9
1
2d
d"1
+
dZ
"^1

(A  c+ "1   2q1)  2(A  c) + "1   4q1
9

1
2d
d"1 = 0; (14)
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which, after simplication, becomes the rst-order condition (4) in the main
body of the paper.
After substitution for "^1 and integration we can rewrite (14) to obtain
(A  c+ 4d  2q1) (5 (A  c) + 2d  10q1) = 0:
There are two solutions: q1 = 12 (A  c)+ 15d and q1 = 12 (A  c)+ 2d. Since
we require d > "^1 = q1   12 (A  c), only the rst solution is valid. Hence
qr1 =
1
2
(A  c) + 1
5
d:
Using this level of output we obtain "^1 = 15d. The probability of a stockout
can then be computed as
d  1
5
d
2d = 0:4.
7.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The expected second-period output can be computed using q2 =
A c (q1 s1)
2
if q1 > s1, and q2 = A c2 if there is a stockout. This implies:
E (qr2) =
"^1Z
 d

2(A  c)  q1 + "1
3

1
2d
d"1 +
dZ
"^1

A  c
2

1
2d
d"1 (15)
=
1
2
(A  c)  3
25
d: (16)
Total expected output is thus given by qr1 + E (q
r
2) =
1
2 (A  c) + 225d.
The manufacturers total expected prot can be computed as
"^1Z
 d
"
2(A  c) + "1  
 
1
2 (A  c) + 15d

3

1
2
(A  c) + 1
5
d
#
1
2d
d"1
+
"^1Z
 d
" 
2(A  c) + "1  
 
1
2 (A  c) + 15d
2
9
#
1
2d
d"1
+
dZ
"^1
"
A  c+ "1  

1
2
(A  c) + 1
5
d

1
2
(A  c) + 1
5
d

+
(A  c)2
4
#
1
2d
d"1;
which simplies to
E (r) = E (~r) +
d2
25
: (17)
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7.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Using s1 + s2 = q in (5), we obtain s1 = (2q + "1) =4 and s2 = (2q   "1) =4.
After observing "1, the total expected revenue of the intermediary, E(R) =
w1s1 + w2s2, is given by
E(R) = (A  s1 + "1) s1 + (A  s2) s2;
= (A  q)q + 1
8
(2q + "1)
2 :
Prior to observing "1, the intermediary chooses q to maximizeZ d
 d

(A  q)q + 1
8
(2q + "1)
2

1
2d
d"1   (P + cw) q   T:
From the rst-order condition,Z d
 d

A  q + "1
2
 1
2d
d"1   (P + cw) = 0;
we obtain the optimal order quantity q = A (P + cw) and the total expected
prot of the intermediary of
[A  (P + cw)]2
2
+
d2
24
  T:
The manufacturer optimally sets P = c, and extracts the intermedi-
arys prot through the transfer T . This yields the manufacturers expected
output ~qi and the expected prot E
 
~i

.
7.6 Proof of Proposition 6
We have to distinguish between two cases: one where q2 > 0 and one where
q2 = 0. Suppose rst that q2 > 0. In period 2 after "2 has been revealed and
given a wholesale price w2, retailers sell an amount s2 such that the retail
price in period 2 equals their marginal cost, that is (A  s2 + "2) = w2.
The intermediary has to order goods in period 2 before observing "2. Using
s2 = q2+(q1 s1), the intermediarys expected prot maximization problem
in period 2 can be written as
max
q2
(A  q2   q1 + s1   cw)(q2 + q1   s1)  P2q2   T2;
Solving the respective rst-order condition, A  2q2   2q1 + 2s1 = P2 + cw,
yields as solution a quantity
q2 =
A  P2   cw
2
  (q1   s1);
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and an expected retail price equal to
E(p2) =
A+ P2 + cw
2
:
The intermediarys expected prot in period 2 can then be calculated as
int2 =

A+ P2 + cw
2
  cw

A  P2   cw
2
 P2

A  P2   cw
2
  (q1   s1)

  T2
=
(A  P2   cw)2
4
+ P2(q1   s1)  T2:
The manufacturer chooses (P2; T2) such that T2 extracts the intermedi-
arys expected period-2 prot net of the intermediarys outside option, out,
and P2 maximizes
max
P2

(P2   c)

A  P2   cw
2
  (q1   s1)

+
(A  P2   cw)2
4
+ P2(q1   s1)  out
)
:
From the corresponding rst-order condition we obtain the manufacturers
optimal choice P2 = c.
In period 1, after "1 has been revealed, the intermediary sets a wholesale
price w1 and retailers purchase and sell quantity s1, such that (A  s1 + "1) =
w1. The intermediarys revenue hence is equal to (A  s1 + "1) s1 and the
corresponding marginal prot in period one isMR1 cw = A 2s1+"1 cw.
The intermediarys inter-temporal arbitrage condition is that MR1  
cw =
dOut
d(q1 s1) , that is, a unit sold in period 2 instead of period 1 has to yield
the same marginal prot as one sold in period 1, where the intermediarys
prot in period 2 is determined by its outside option, as the rest is extracted
by the manufacturer through T2. We hence have
A  2s1 + "1 = A  2(q1   s1); (18)
which is identical to (5) if q1 = ~qi.
The intermediarys total expected prot is given by
E

(A  s1 + "1   cw) s1   P1q1   (T1   out)
	
;
where we note that the manufacturer can extract out in period 1. Using
(18) to obtain s1 and substituting for out from (6), we can rewrite the
intermediarys expected prot as
E

A+
"1
2
  q1
2
  cw

q1 +
"21
8
  P1q1   T1

:
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The intermediary maximizes this prot by ordering a quantity equal to q1 =
A  P1   cw and earns an expected prot of
E
(
(A  P1   cw)2
2
+
"1
2
(A  P1   cw) + "
2
1
8
  T1
)
:
It is now straightforward to show that the manufacturer chooses a two-part
tari¤ such that P1 = c and T1 extracts the intermediarys prot. Thus the
quantity shipped to the intermediary by the manufacturer in period 1 is the
same as without re-ordering, namely qi1 = A  c  cw.
Next suppose that q2 = 0. In this case we know from the proof of the
previous proposition that qi1 = ~q
i = A  c  cw.
7.7 Proof of Proposition 7
The manufacturers expected prot with intermediation and re-ordering can
be written as the sum of the expected prot in period 1 and in period 2 and
thus asZ d
 d
f(A  c  cw)
2
2
+ (A  c  cw)"1
2
+
"21
8
g 1
2d
d1
+
Z d
0
f((A  c  cw)
2
4
+ c(q1   s1)  outg 1
2d
d1;
where the rst line corresponds to the expected total revenue of the inter-
mediary in period 1 and the second line corresponds to the total expected
net revenue of the intermediary given that an order is placed only if the
realization of demand in period 1 is above average. Using s1 =
qi1
2 +
"1
4 ,
qi1 = A  c  cw, (6) yields the desired result.
7.8 Proof of Proposition 11
With retailer-controlled inventory consumer surplus is given by:
CSr =
1
2
E [(A  p1) s1] + 1
2
E [(A  p2) s2]
=
1
2
E [(s1   "1) s1] + 1
2
E
h
(s2)
2
i
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where
1
2
E [(s1   "1) s1]
=
1
2
1
5
dZ
 d
 
A  c  "1
3
+
 
1
2 (A  c) + 15d

3
!

 
A  c+ 2"1
3
+
 
1
2 (A  c) + 15d

3
!
1
2d
d"1
+
1
2
dZ
1
5
d

1
2
(A  c) + 1
5
d  "1

1
2
(A  c) + 1
5
d

1
2d
d"1
=
1
2
1
5
dZ
 d

15(A  c) + 2d  10"1
30

15(A  c) + 2d+ 20"1
30

1
2d
d"1
+
1
2
dZ
1
5
d

5(A  c) + 2d  10"1
10

1
2
(A  c) + 1
5
d

1
2d
d"1
=
1
8
(A  c)2   1
50
d (A  c)  9
250
d2;
and
1
2
E
h
(s2)
2
i
=
1
2
1
5
dZ
 d
 
A  c+ 23
 
1
2 (A  c) + 15d
  A c+2"13
2
!2
1
2d
d"1
+
1
2
dZ
1
5
d

A  c
2
2 1
2d
d"1
=
1
2
1
5
dZ
 d

15(A  c) + 2d  10"1
30
2 1
2d
d"1 +
1
2
dZ
1
5
d

A  c
2
2 1
2d
d"1
=
1
8
(A  c)2 + 3
50
d(A  c) + 2
125
d2
Hence we can rewrite consumer surplus as
CSr =
1
8
(A  c)2 + 1
8
(A  c)2   1
50
d (A  c) + 3
50
d(A  c)  9
250
d2 +
2
125
d2
=
1
4
(A  c)2 + 1
25
(A  c) d  1
50
d2
25
Now consider inventory control by an intermediary and assume that
cw = 0. Consumer surplus is then given by
CSi =
1
2
E [(s1   "1) s1] + 1
2
E
h
(s2)
2
i
where
1
2
E [(s1   "1) s1] = 1
2
dZ
 d

A  c
2
  3"1
4

A  c
2
+
"1
4

1
2d
d"1
=
1
8
(A  c)2   1
32
d2
1
2
E
h
(s2)
2
i
=
1
2
0Z
 d

A  c
2
  "1
4
2 1
2d
d"1 +
1
2
dZ
0

A  c
2
2 1
2d
d"1
=
1
8
(A  c)2 + 1
32
d(A  c) + 1
192
d2
Hence
CSi =
1
4
(A  c)2 + 1
32
d(A  c)  5
192
d2:
We rst can show that for cw = 0 consumer surplus when retailers con-
trol inventory exceeds consumer surplus when inventory is controlled by an
intermediary
CSr   CSi = 1
25
(A  c) d  1
50
d2  

1
32
d(A  c)  5
192
d2

> 0:
Now we compute social welfare.
SW r = CSr + E (r) =
1
4
(A  c)2 + 1
25
(A  c) d  1
50
d2 +
(A  c)2
2
+
d2
25
=
3
4
(A  c)2 + 1
25
d(A  c) + 1
50
d2
SW i = CSi + E (i) =
1
4
(A  c)2 + 1
32
d(A  c)  5
192
d2 +
(A  c)2
2
+
5d2
96
=
3
4
(A  c)2 + 1
32
d(A  c) + 5
192
d2
SW r   SW i = 3
4
(A  c)2 + 1
25
d(A  c) + 1
50
d2
 

3
4
(A  c)2 + 1
32
d(A  c) + 5
192
d2

=
7
800
d(A  c)  29
4800
d2 =
d [42(A  c)  29d]
4800
> 0
We thus obtain SW r > SW i for all admissible d even if cw = 0.
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